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ABSTRACT
In this paper we attempt to disentangle the effects of deregulation on rail
costs from those directly attributable to mergers and acquisitions. We employ
a translog variable cost function, based on an unbalanced panel data set of
annual observations for major US Class I railroads from 1974 to 1986.
We find that both deregulation and mergers contributed significantly to
cost savings. Using a simulation analysis that employs the fixed effects of the
merged firms and their constituents, we estimate that the cost reductions
obtained from merger ranged a high of 33 percent for the Burlington Northern to
a low of a 3 percent cost increase for the CSX. Further analyses of changes in
operating characteristic and labor force rationalizations yielded cost
differentials of similar magnitudes. However, firms that were not engaged in
significant merger activities experienced similar cost differentials due to
changes in operating characteristics and labor force utilization, indicating that
consolidation was not a prerequisite for such rationalizations. An analysis of
Tobin's marginal q similarly indicated little variation in its behavior merged
between merged and non merged firms.
We conclude that although mergers did confer some benefits on the
participating firms, they were not a prerequisite for railroads being able to
achieve substantial cost savings during the post Staggers period. Deregulation
also had an enormous direct impact, which may indeed, be greater.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Over a decade has elapsed since the passage of the Stagger's Act in 1980,
the final and most sweeping legislation in a decade-long series of rail reforms.
Few analysts question its success. In 1976, for example, seven major carriers
were bankrupt.l The other 45 remaining carriers were burdened with unprofitable
operations along low-density routes and, due to chronically low rates of return,
were unable to attract capital or divert cash to badly deteriorating high-density
routes. In contrast, by 1986, the U.S. rail system had consolidated considerably:
25,000 miles of track had been sold or abandoned, and seven carriers handled more
than 70 percent of the freight traffic. Rates of return had increased sharply,
and the cost of capital had fallen.2
Although there is little question that deregulation generally has played a
key role in increasing the viability of the U.S. rail system, the role that
specific elements of deregulation have played is not well understood.
Deregulation occurred in three principle areas: 1) reduced restrictions on the
rate-setting ability of the railroads; 2) relaxed common carrier obligations and
abandonment policies; and 3) simplified merger applications and approval
procedures. Railroads have proceeded along each of these paths.
The effects of eased rate restrictions and capital adjustments in
conjunction with network rationalization via abandonments have received
considerable attention in recent literature. 3 However, the effects of the
large-scale mergers that have occurred since deregulation have received little
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attention. This study attempts to fill this gap by disentangling, for a
particular set of railroad firms, the cost savings directly attributable to
mergers from those due to the more general operational adjustments permitted by
deregulation. We show that the cost savings attributable to each of these
activities was highly variable. Some railroads (e.g., the Burlington Northern)
were able to utilize mergers and changes in network utilization to reduce their
costs substantially, while others (e.g., Norfolk Southern) appeared to have
gained relatively little from mergers or deregulation-induced changes in
operating characteristics. In contrast, virtually all railroads have experienced
substantial cost savings through labor adjustments, which appear to have been
encouraged (or, at least, not discouraged) by deregulation. Thus on balance,
deregulation appears to have led to significant changes in railroad operating
behavior that overshadows mergers per se in the industry's advance towards
viability.
This paper takes the following form. Section II provides an overview of
railroad mergers and summarizes a number of important changes in rail operations
that have occurred in recent years. Section III discusses the nature of economies
of mergers and outlines our approach to estimating the cost savings due to
mergers. Section IV provides estimates of the cost savings due to merger and
their sources. In Section V we present a brief summary and discuss some policy
implications.
II. MERGERS AND OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RAILROADS
Perhaps the most striking occurrence of the past 15 years has been the
dramatic consolidation of the number of firms in the rail industry. In 1974 there
were 56 Class I railroads; by 1986, this number had fallen to 21. While some of
3this reduction in numbers was due to the loss of class I status,4 the bulk of
it was due to consolidation and merger.
Before deregulation, mergers typically involved railroads with substantial
parallel trackage.5 The ICC hearings on these mergers were often lengthy,6
focusing on the welfare tradeoff between the projected cost efficiencies
occasioned by consolidation and economies of scale and the losses to consumers
arising from noncompetitive pricing. Because of the potential for noncompetitive
behavior, the judgments were generally complex and often involved granting
extensive trackage rights to other railroads to ensure competition and/or the
inclusion of smaller, satellite firms to guarantee service.
In contrast, mergers in the post-Stagger's period have primarily been end-
to-end consolidations that have not involved competing lines. 7 Consequently,
the ICC hearings on these consolidations have been relatively brief and have
focused on the potential efficiencies occasioned by the implementation of joint
marketing agreements and the consolidation of track and maintenance systems. In
these cases, reduced competition has not been an issue.
This study concentrates on four major mergers and acquisitions that took
place during the period of regulatory relaxation and reform (the Burlington
Northern, the CSX, the Norfolk Southern, and the Union Pacific System) and
compares their cost savings (and the sources of such savings) and capital
utilization to those obtained by railroads not involved in mergers.8 Table 1
provides a summary of the merger histories of these systems.
Because of the implications of deregulation and mergers for the operation
of the railroads, it is useful to examine changes in selected operating
characteristics for the period 1974-1986, which includes a time prior to
deregulation as well as a period during which substantial deregulation occurred.
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Table 1
MAJOR U. S. CLASS I RAIL CONSOLIDATIONS, 1979-84
********************* **
Baltimore & Ohio
Chesapeake & Ohio => Chessie System
Western Maryland (CSX1)
=> CSX
Seaboard Cost Line> Seaboard System
Louisville & Nashville => Seaboard System(SBD)
* ****** ************ * * * *
Burlington Northern => BN System (BNSL)
St. Louis - San Francisco
=> BN S,
Colorado Southern
Fort Worth-Denver
Union Pacific
Missouri Pacific => Unioi
Western Pacific
Southern Railway
System => Nor:
Norfolk & Western
rransport Corp.
(CSX2)
ystem (BNSYS)
n Pacific System
(UPSYS)
folk Southern RR 
(NSC)
These are given in Table 2. Since increased run-through operations are
frequently cited as a source of significant savings from end-to-end mergers,
onewould expect the average length of haul (ALH) of a merged firm to be
significantly greater than that of the constituent firms prior to merger. As is
seen in the final two columns of the first page of Table 2, two merged systems
exhibited this trend: the Burlington Northern System (BNSYS) and the CSX2,
respectively, experienced an increase of 57 percent and 12 percent in ALH. In
4
5contrast, the Union Pacific system (UPSYS) and the Norfolk Southern System (NSC)
show no such movement. Furthermore, several roads not involved in mergers show
large increases in ALH -- Denver and Rio Grande (DRG), 35 percent; the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe (ATSF), 18 percent; and the Southern Pacific (SPSYS), 18
percent -- indicating that merger was not a prerequisite to increased ALH.
Each railroad with a marked increase in ALH has, however, experienced a
sharp increase in the relative importance of coal in its traffic mix during this
period. This is shown in the final two columns of the second page of Table 2.
Since coal has a relatively low value-weight ratio, it must be carried long
distances to be profitable. Not surprisingly, coal generally has the longest ALH
of any commodity type. Therefore, increases in ALH can be attributed primarily
to increases in coal traffic over the period. The fact that ALH increases among
the merged entities are limited to the heavy coal carriers provides a preliminary
indication that efficiency gains from increased run-through operations may not
be substantial.
Capital restructuring is another important aspect of rail operations during
this period, since the Stagger's Act substantially relaxed network abandonment
restrictions. A number of merged systems have abandoned significant portions of
their network. For example, the Burlington Northern and the CSX2 have
respectively abandoned or sold 14 percent and 17 percent of their route miles.
However, the replacement value of their way and structures (W&S) capital has
remained relatively constant over this time period, indicating that significant
capital improvements (and maintenance expenditures) over high density roads may
have offset the reductions in capital through line abandonment.9
As was true with ALH, the other merged firms show no such network
consolidation. In fact, the route miles of the Norfolk Southern expanded by 13
III
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TABLE 2
SELECTED COST AND OPERATING STATISTICS, CLASS I RAILROADS, 1974 AND 1986
VARIABLE COSTS
(Million 1971$)
1974 1986
307.9
335.4
41.0
684.3
401.0
346.3
747.4
1431.7
FREIGHT
(Million
1974
OUTPUT
Ton-Miles)
1986
29,699
29,601
3,552
62,851
35,198
38,099
73,298
1,588.3 136,149
AVERAGE LENGTH OF HAUL
(Miles)
1974 1986
263
264
125
256*
224
295
261*
130,000 291
704.9 76,302 519
146.7 15,000 376
21.8 2,504 243
873.4 1,043.7 93,806 190,000 489 770
553.9 55,601 625
284.7 37,702 386
61.6 5,638 478
900.2 1,213.7 98,941 140,000 526 524
462.8 45,150 295
541.7 53,000 333
1004.5 1,308.9 98,150 91,414 316* 326
623.7
249.3
83.5
338.1
68.0
65.4
83.0
752.6
239.9
NA
340.2
100.6
106.1
204.1
56,900
24,901
8,799
32,101
7,340
5,541
10,600
67,141
26,576
11,130
19,922
11,187
8,102
19,502
626
309
321
303
270
365
403
740
320
432
277
346
324
392
* Computed as ton-mile weighted average of constituent's ALH.
RAILROAD
BO
CO
WM
CHESSIE
SCL
LN
SBD
CSX2
BN
SLSF
CS
BNSYS
UP
MP
WP
UPSYS
SOU
NW
NSC
ATSF
CNWT
DRGW
ICG
KCS
MKT
SOO
7TABLE 2 (Continued)
CAPITAL STOCK
(Million 1971$)
RAILROAD 1974
BO
CO
WM
CHESSIE
SCL
LN
SBD
1986
1,952
1,124
229
3,304
ROUTE MILES OWNED
AND OPERATED (Miles)
1974 1986
3,580
4,019
669
8,268
1,442
1,256
2,697
8,730
6,002
14,732
PERCENT TONS PERCENT TONS
AGRICULTURE COAL
1974 1986 1974 1986
6.7
4.8
12.3
6.5*
10.4
9.6
10.0*
38.8
56.8
40.0
46.9*
9.6
41.4
23.9*
5,784 23,000 19,018 8.7* 9.0 32.3*
4,293 21,298 28.5 21.5
688 4,539 26.1 7.1
121 549 41.4 15.8
5,102 5,252 26,386 22,778 28.5* 19.2 18.0*
1,861 8,764 28.7 14.1
1,355 7,938 24.5 10.3
320 1,332 28.9 0.8
3,536 4,235 18,034 19,370 27.1* 17.2 11.9*
1,718 6,422 10.4 24.1
1,715 4,419 11.5 49.8
3,433 3,884 10,841 16,068 11.0* 11.5 38.0*
2,538
1,079
406
1,396
288
276
512
12,075
9,839
1,800
8,929
1,537
1,902
4,353
11,146
5,563
1,573
3,608
1,534
1,884
6,263
31.1
27.0
13.5
17.8
18.5
29.9
23.1
25.4
27.7
8.6
17.5
8.5
18.6
27.7
4.7
17.0
40.8
26.3
1.7
4.6
3.1
38.2
51.8
35.1
45.2
29.8
24.6
52.0
33.7
43.5
24.2
20.0
* Computed as ton-miles weighted
percent agriculture
average of constituent's percent coal and
5,395CSX2
BN
SLSF
CS
BNSYS
UP
MP
WP
UPSYS
SOU
NW
NSC
ATSF
CNWT
DRGW
ICG
KCS
MKT
SOO
2,256
981
367
1,779
183
279
545
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Railroad/System Abbreviation
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe ATSF
Burlington Northern BN
Chicago, Northwest Transit CNWT
Colorado Southern CS
Denver, Rio Grande Western DRGW
Fort Worth, Denver FWD
Grand Trunk Western GTW
Illinois Central Gulf ICG
Kansas City Southern KCS
Missouri-Kansas-Texas MKT
Missouri Pacific MP
Norfolk & Western NW
St. Louis, San Francisco SLSF
Soo Line SOO
Southern Pacific SP
Southern Railway System SOU
Union Pacific Railway UP
Western Pacific WP
Consolidated Rail Corp. CRC
Chessie System CHESSIE
Seaboard System SBD
CSX Corporation (1981-82) CSX1
CSX Corporation (1983-86) CSX2
Burlington Northern - St. Louis System BNSL
Burlington Northern System BNSYS
Union Pacific System UPSYS
Norfolk-Southern Corporation NSC
9percent during this period.1 0 Furthermore, a number of roads not involved in
mergers significantly rationalized their network. For example the Chicago
Northwest (CNWT) and the Illinois Central Gulf (ICG) respectively abandoned or
sold 44 percent and 60 percent of their total route miles during this period.
Clearly, opportunities for network consolidation were not limited to systems
undertaking mergers, nor was the opportunity seized by every merged firm.
Therefore, mergers apparently were not a necessary step in the movement toward
efficient route consolidation.
With this information as background, we now turn to the question of the
measurement of the cost savings occasioned by mergers and deregulation.
III. THE ANALYSIS OF COST SAVINGS
The potential efficiency gains from mergers fall into three categories:
reduced short-run variable costs; reduced long run costs due to adjustments in
W&S capital toward efficient levels; and enhanced service quality. Cost functions
provide a useful framework to evaluate these efficiencies.
Consider a total cost function for railroad r in year t in which variable
costs and fixed costs are related as follows:
T v
Crt = Crt(Yrt, Wrt, trt, Tr, Fr, Krt) + PrtKrt (1)
where CTrt and Crt are respectively a short run total and a short run variable
cost function for firm r at time t;ll Yrt is ton-miles of revenue freight;1 2
wrt is a vector of prices for variable inputs (labor, equipment, fuel, materials
and supplies); trt is a vector of technological variables (route miles, ALH,
traffic mix); Tr is a vector of time-related variables (an annual time counter
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to accommodate technical change, as well as time counters for years since
deregulation occurred and years since firm r was last involved in a major
merger); Fr is a vector of firm-specific indicator variables to reflect network
characteristics; Krt is fixed way and structures (ws) capital; and Prt is the
ex ante cost of capital.
Note that with the exception of route miles, this cost specification does
not include specific measures of a given railroad's network configuration, which
includes factors that embrace the logistics of a firms's route structure -- end-
to-end vs. hub-and-spoke, track grade, density of track utilization, etc. It is
of course true that such factors affect variable costs. Unfortunately, however,
measures of these variables are not available. As a practical matter, we
therefore assume that these unobserved network configurations are invariant for
a given railroad over time and attempt to capture the aggregate impact of such
network effects on costs by introducing a series of firm-specific indicator
variables into the cost function.
The end-to-end merger proposals presented to the ICC in the post-Stagger's
era have cited a variety of potential benefits, typically focusing on "increased
run-through operations" and "more efficient car utilization".13 Whether these
alleged efficiency gains are in fact realized has not received much attention,
perhaps because the prevailing wisdom is that scale economies are prevalent
throughout the industry.1 4 However,the assumptions underlying the conventional
measure of economies of scale may not be useful in assessing the cost
efficiencies likely to result from end-to-end mergers.
To clarify this point, recall that the conventional measure of returns
to scale takes the following form, which in the case of railroads is often
referred to as returns to density: 15
11
RTS = [alncT/alny ]-1 (2)
where CT(.) is defined in (1). Short run returns to scale or density (i.e. the
inverse of the elasticity of total cost with respect to output, holding all other
factors -- including capital -- fixed) are said to be increasing, constant, or
decreasing as RTS is greater than, equal, or less than one. In almost all rail
studies to date, it is this version of scale economies that has been estimated,
and without exception the finding is one of substantial returns to scale.
However, the assumptions underlying this scale concept may not be useful in
assessing the cost efficiencies likely to result from end-to-end mergers for two
principal reasons.
First, this short run RTS measure implicitly treats all other arguments
in the total cost function as fixed. Consider, however, a merger between
railroads A and B, assuming for the moment that they are of equal size. While
the new entity, railroad C, has more output than A or B, it also supports a
bigger route structure and a larger W&S capital stock. In addition railroad B
may carry traffic with significantly different characteristics (longer ALH,
greater proportion of coal traffic, etc.) than, say, railroad A. It is also
possible that the input prices may differ, since fuel prices differ
geographically and railroads now negotiate a significant proportion of their
labor contracts separately. Therefore, to observe an estimated RTS of, say, 1.5
and conclude that a merger would provide significant cost savings would be
premature.
Second, RTS is a measure of expansion at the margin. While marginal
measures may be appropriate in cases when a large system engulfs a small one
(e.g., the Burlington Northern's merger with the St.Louis and San Francisco),
they are less meaningful in cases involving firms of nearly equal size (e.g., the
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merger of the Southern and Norfolk-Western roads to create the Norfolk Southern
System or the merger of the Chessie and Family lines to form the CSX). Scale
economies could well be exhausted at output levels moderately beyond the output
of each individual firm, and in such cases, a simple marginal approach would not
capture the effects caused by quantum changes in the scale of operations.
The first issue noted above can be addressed by constructing a more
comprehensive measure of firm expansion, in which not only output but also route-
miles and W&S capital change in response to an end-to-end rail merger.1 6
Specifically, consider a measure hereafter referred to a "returns to expansion"
(RTE), which we define as:
RTE = [alncT/alny + aln CT /8lnN + a lnCT/alnK] -1 (3)
where K represents W&S capital and N represents the number of miles of track
owned and operated by the railroad. Moreover. the second issue noted above can
be addressed simply by estimating RTE for the merged entities, ex post.
Although this alternative definition of scale economies generalizes
conventional measure of RTS by incorporating changes in size related variables,
it does not capture efficiencies related to fundamental changes in a railroad's
operational structure or characteristics. These potential efficiencies can be
dealt with by considering the changes in the fixed effects (network
configuration) and the technological variables of each constituent railroad and
their merged counterpart. To this end, we perform the counterfactual experiment
of comparing the estimated costs of the merged firm with the sum of the estimated
costs of the constituent firms had they had not merged. We can further decompose
the cost differences into network effects, capital effects, and operating effects
by permitting specific elements to change in the merged and constituent firms.
13
Specifically, we undertake the following analysis for each of the merged
firms: 1) retain the firm-specific network effects for each constituent firm, and
estimate new firm-specific effects for the newly consolidated firms; (2) for the
post-merger period, project variable costs for the constituent firms under the
assumption that they did not merge; (3) compare these projected costs to those
estimated for the merged entity, thereby producing an estimate of the total cost
savings attributable to the merger. (4) decompose the estimated cost savings into
its component parts by assuming separate adjustments in each component, while
holding the other component(s) constant. By analyzing differences in projected
costs due to changes in fixed effects (i.e. network structure) alone and fixed
effects in conjunction with changes in operating characteristics, we can
appoximate the magnitudes of the cost savings due to mergers alone and the cost
savings due to deregulation-induced changes in operating characteristics.
In terms of long-run capital adjustments, note that mergers potentially
provide railroads with an opportunity to adjust their capital levels easily
through the consolidation of maintenance yards and the elimination of nodal
switching facilities. If merged firms exploited these potentials for cost
savings, one would expect to observe their capital to adjust to long-run
efficient levels more readily than their unmerged counterparts. In particular,
minimization of the total cost function given in eq (1) yields the following
equilibrium condition:
a Cv (4)
where p represents the rental cost of capital. Thus in equilibrium the savings
in variable costs from a marginal unit increase in capital (the shadow value of
capital) should just equal the ex ante rental cost of acquiring the marginal unit
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(the opportunity cost). Since capital should be subject to diminishing returns,
shadow values in excess of the opportunity cost indicate undercapitalization,
while shadow values below the opportunity cost indicate overcapitalizatation.
If mergers enhanced a railroad's ability to adjust its capital, we would
expect to observe a greater movement toward capital equilibrium on the part of
firms that participated in merger activity than those that did not. Consequently
by observing the relative capital adjustments of merged and unmerged firms, we
can assess whether mergers affected long-run as well as short-run costs.
IV. THE COST EFFICIENCIES OF MERGERS
The estimated cost efficiencies in this paper are based on Berndt et al.
(1991), in which estimates of a cost function are computed using a time-series,
cross section of the major class I railroads for the period 1974-1986.17 Thus
this data set provides a picture of the technological structure of the railroads
during the latter period of regulation and the period of substantial
deregulation.
Because of our interest in mergers in this analysis, we will focus on the
behavior of the four major railroads that engaged in end-to-end mergers during
the sample period (Burlington Northern, CSX System, Norfolk Southern System, and
the Union Pacific System). In addition, we include other railroads that engaged
in other merger activity (Conrail, which was formed by the government out of the
bankrupt eastern roads, the Grand Trunk Western, and the Soo). Finally, for
purpose of comparison, we will consider the behavior of a number of
representative non-merged systems: the Atchison, Topeka and the Santa Fe (a
large western road); the Illinois, Central Gulf (a large southern road); the
Denver Rio Grande (a small western road); and the Missouri Kansas Texas (a small
15
western road). 18
Berndt et al. (1991) estimate a translog approximation of a short-run
variable cost function and its associated input share equations of the following
general form:
(5)
Cv = CV(y, w, XF, t, T, F)
where Cv represents variable costs,1 9 y represents total freight ton-miles, w
represents a vector of prices for variable inputs (labor, equipment, fuel, and
"other"), xF represents W&S capital, t represents a vector of technological
variables (miles of track, average length of haul, agricultural tonnage as a
proportion of total tonnage, coal tonnage as a proportion of total tonnage), T
represents a vector of time counters (a time trend to capture technical change
and dummy variables to represent time since last merger and time since
deregulation), and F encompasses a vector of firm-specific indicator variables
to capture the effects of the network. Although this specification uses an
aggregate output variable of ton-miles, costs are permitted to vary with the
composition of tonnage carried among agricultural goods, coal, and "other"
commodities--primarily manufactured goods.
The firm-specific indicator variables were added to the intercept and the
linear terms of the input price variables of the cost function, as well as to the
intercept terms of the input share equations. This procedure assumes, in effect,
that firm-specific differences in technology consist of a "neutral" component and
an input-specific component, but are independent of the firms' output, W&S
capital, and technological characteristics. Moreover, the cross-equation
constraints on the fixed effect coefficients permit network effects, unobserved
by the econometrician, to affect the firms' cost minimizing variable input
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decisions. 2 0
Since the sample period included a substantial number of years in which rate
regulation was significantly reduced, it is likely that output and its related
technological variables (ALH, % coal, % agriculture) are endogenous to the firm,
rather than exogenous. Consequently, the cost function and its associated input
share equations were estimated by a 3SLS procedure that assumed that the follow-
ing variables and their transformations were endogenous: output, average length
of haul, the proportion of coal traffic, and the proportion of agricultural
traffic.21
We now turn to the impact of mergers upon rail costs and operations. We
begin with a discussion of a number of measures of cost elasticities and scale
economies and then consider the differential impact of mergers upon costs and the
capital adjustments of merged and unmerged firms.
A. Estimated Cost Elasticities and Returns to Scale
Table 3 presents a number of selected cost elasticities and returns to scale
and their standard errors, 2 2 based on the translog cost function estimated in
Berndt et al. (1991). A comparison of the parameter estimates with their standard
errors indicate that the estimates of returns to scale and cost elasticities are
generally statistically significant. The estimates of traditional short run
returns to scale, computed using equation (2), are all greater than unity. In
many cases, they are substantially so, even in 1986.
As we noted previously, however, in end-to-end mergers it is not likely
that expansion would occur with W&S capital and route-mileage fixed. Thus more
appropriate measure of scale effects would involve incorporating changes in W&S
capital (K) and route miles (N), and estimating returns to expansion (RTE) as
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given in Eq (3). The next section of Table 3 provides estimates of the elasticity
of short run total costs with respect to the other components of RTE: W&S capital
(K); and route miles (N). For all railroads, the W&S elasticity is negative and
substantial,2 3 while that for route mileage is positive, but less than unity.
These estimates imply that, cet. par., if a railroad abandons or sells 10 percent
of its low density trackage, it may expect reductions in total variable costs
between 0.6 percent and 6.4 percent. Eased line abandonment restrictions
therefore may represent significant steps toward improving the economic viability
of railroads.
To highlight the importance of ALH and the proportion of coal traffic on
costs, Table 3 also presents estimates of elasticities of total costs with
respect to ALH and the percentage of coal traffic. As expected, the partial ALH
elasticities are negative, and many are substantial. These indicate that
railroads face considerable incentives to increase their average length of haul,
either by greater use of run-through operations (whether attained through joint
marketing agreements or merger) or by changes in their traffic mix. The cost
elasticities with respect to % Coal are mostly negative, and are smaller in
absolute value than those with respect to ALH, indicating that coal usually
involves longer hauls and larger shipments, both of which are the source of
substantial economies.
Returns to expansion, which incorporate simultaneous changes in output, W&S
capital and route miles, are given in the last section of Table 3. The short-run
returns provide estimates of RTE conditional on the actual capital stock; the
long run estimates of RTE are conditional on the optimal capital stock.2 4 Both
the short run and long run estimates of RTE are substantially below those of the
estimates of conventional returns to scale or of density, although they are still
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above unity, indicating that railroads could exploit economies of scale by
expanding through end-to-end mergers. Although the long run estimates of RTE are
somewhat below the short run estimates, they are quite similar, indicating that
optimal capital adjustments would not substantially change the incentives to
expand through merger.
An examination of the merged rail systems indicates that the RTE generally
fell post merger, particularly in the case of the Norfolk Southern and the CSX.
Since the merged entity is considerably larger than its constituent firms, this
is to be expected. Nevertheless, the RTE of the merged entities is sufficiently
large to indicate that returns to scale are pervasive in the industry, even if
route mileage and capital expand with output. Clearly, these economies are not
primarily dependent on the more intensive utilization of a given network and its
associated capital. Thus it is likely that mergers were able to yield economies
of expansion to the merged entities.
B. Counterfactual Costs Simulations
Estimates of the magnitude of these economies can be obtained by a
simulation analysis in which we perform a counterfactual experiment where we
estimate the aggregate costs of the constituent firms had they had not merged and
compare those costs with those estimated for their merged counterpart. In
undertaking this exercise, however, it is important to note that cost
differentials arise from several sources: (1) organizational and unobserved
network changes that are reflected in the fixed effects; (2) increases in the
scale of output; and (3) changes in operating characteristics such as ALH, W&S
capital route miles, and percentage coal traffic. Because these latter variables
were also doubtless affected by the regulatory freedom afforded by the Staggers
III
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Act, changes in them cannot be attributed solely to merger. To disentangle these
effects we performed a number of conceptual experiments.
B.1. "Pure" Merger Simulations
The first experiment represents the "pure" merger effect and attributes cost
differentials to organizational changes and scale effects. To this end we use our
estimates of fixed effects for each of the constituent firms; we project into the
post-merger years constituent railroad costs as if they had not merged and
compare the sum of their costs with fitted costs incurred by merged firms which
utilize their own fixed effects. Specifically, we assume that: factor prices for
constituent firms equal those of the merged entity; the deregulation time
counters change over time; output and technical factors shift so that the sum of
constituent output in each period matches merged output (with the output assigned
to each constituent firm being proportional to its pre-merged output); and the
output-weighted averages of the constituent firm technical factors equal the
technical factors of the merged entity2 5. Since the output of the merged firm
is greater than that of each of its individual constituents, the estimated cost
differentials reflect returns to expansion as well as those arising from
organizational changes and unobserved network effects. Nevertheless, because the
technical variables or operating characteristics are assumed to be the same for
the merged firm and its constituents, these estimated cost differentials can be
thought of as capturing the pure merger effect.
The results of these simulations are contained in Table 4. The column
marked "Fixed Effects of Const. Firms" presents the "pure" merger effect, and
measures the cost differentials arising from differences in the scale of output
and the fixed effects of the merged firm and its constituents (which represent
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Table 4
Cost Savings Due to Merger and Operating
Characteristics, Merged Railroads
Cost Savings in 1986 if Railroad Had:
All
Oper.
Charact,
Const.
Firms
.612
31.3
.475
37.0
.034
2.2
-.458
26.2
WS
Capital
of
Const.
Firms
Rt
Miles
of
Const.
Firms
(Billions of 1974 $)
.013 .211
0.7 10.8
.014 .144
1.1 11.7
.041 .025
2.6 1.6
-.003 -.306
-0.2 -17.5
ALH %
of Coal
of
Const. Const.
Firms Firms
.342
17.5
.003
0.1
.281
22.7
.060
4.9
-.013
-0.8
-. 107
-6.1
-.003
-0.3
- .001
0.1
Fixed
Effects
of
Const.
Firms
Firm Years
CSX 81-86
Savings
Percent
BN
-.073
3.7
80-86
Savings
Percent
UPS
.404
32.7
83-86
Savings
Percent
NSC
.283
14.9
82-86
Savings
Percent
.225
12.9
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unobserved organizational and network changes). In 1986, these cost savings ranged from
a high of $400 million (32.7 percent) for the Burlington Northern System to a low of
an actual incremental cost of mergers of $73 million (3.7 percent) for the CSX, with
the Union Pacific System and the Norfolk Southern System each achieving savings of
approximately $230 million as a result of merger, respectively representing 14.9
percent and 12.9 percent of their total costs.
B.2. Simulations With Partial Changes in Operating Characteristics
The other simulations assume that in the counterfactual experiments only
a subset of the constituent firms' operating characteristics would have changed
"but for" the merger. We continue to assume that the deregulation time counters
change over time and that the factor prices and total output are the same for the
merged firms and the aggregate of the constituent firms. The first of these
simulations assumes that each constituent firms maintains all its pre-merger
operating characteristic levels and compares the aggregate costs of the
constituent firms (each of which has its pre-merger operating characteristics)
with the costs of the merged entity (which has its own operating characteristic);
subsequent simulations assume that each of the constituent firms continues to
maintain one of its pre-merger operating characteristics at the pre-merger level
(e.g., W&S capital), but has the other operating characteristics change to the
levels of the merged firm. In this way, we can estimate the cost savings
associated with the pre and post merger operating characteristics. Of course,
since these operating characteristics were doubtless affected by the regulatory
freedom associated with the Staggers Act, their changes cannot be attributed to
merger alone. Nevertheless, a comparison of the cost differentials attributed to
fixed effects alone and the cost savings attributed to fixed effects cum
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operating characteristics should set an upper bound for the cost savings due to
merger.
B.2.1 Constituent Firms Retain All Pre-Merger Operating Characteristic
Levels
The first of these simulations assesses the combined effects of all of the
operating characteristics and assumes that each constituent firm continues to
utilize its pre-merger operating characteristics, while the merged entity
utilizes its own operating characteristics. The cost differentials due to the
combined changes in operating characteristics are given in the column marked "All
Oper. Charact. Const. Firms" in Table 4. In this case, we see that the change in
operating characteristics actually imposed substantial costs upon the Norfolk
Southern System, totalling approximately $460 million in 1986. In contrast, the
other merged systems gained from the changes in operating characteristics, with
the greatest gains accruing to the CSX System, which realized an additional $613
million (31 percent) cost saving. The Burlington Northern also gained
substantially ($460 million or 31 percent), while the Union Pacific System gained
relatively little ($34 million or 2 percent).
B.2.2 Constituent Firms Retain Pre-Merger Operating Characteristic Levels
For One Characteristic
The next four simulations attempt to assess the impact of changes in
specific operating characteristics and assesses the cost differential arising
from changes in W&S capital, route miles, ALH, and the percentage of coal
traffic. In each simulation, the level of one characteristic remains at the pre-
merger level for the constituent firms while the other characterisitics are
allowed to vary. The estimated costs for this "modified" constituent firm are
III
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then compared to the constituent costs had all characteristics changed. The gains
from changes in W&S capital and the percentage of coal traffic are uniformly
small. In contrast the gains from changes in route miles and average length of
haul are variable and relatively large in the case of the Burlington Northern and
the CSX. However, they are negligible for the Union Pacific, and actually
negative for the Norfolk Southern. Since the Norfolk Southern was attempting to
position itself strategically to acquire Conrail during this period, it is
difficult to determine whether the changes in route miles and ALH can be
attributed to merger per se or its unsuccessful attempt to acquire Conrail.
B.3. Counterfactual Simulations Summary
With the exception of the Union Pacific, the merged firms appear to have
experienced greater cost differentials from changes in operating characteristics
than from the "pure" merger effects arising from differences in the scale of
operations and fixed effects that reflect unobserved changes in network
utilization and managerial organization. The Burlington Northern appears to have
realized the greatest gains from merger, achieving economies from both the "pure"
merger effects and changes in operating characteristics. In contrast, while the
Norfolk Southern gained from the pure merger effect, it experienced greater
losses due to changes in operating characteristics. Because of its strategic
interactions with Conrail, however, it is likely that this was not primarily due
to merger or deregulation.
B.4. Counterfactual Simulations For Firms Not Involved in Mergers
As we have discussed previously, all railroads were able to adjust their
operating characteristics in response to the regulatory freedom afforded by the
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Staggers Act. Thus it is unclear whether the cost savings obtained by the merged
firms due to changes in operating characteristics were due to merger or
regulatory freedom, or a combination of both. To shed some light on this
question, we perform a similar counterfactual experiment with railroads that did
not participate in end-to-end mergers and simulate their projected costs if they
had maintained their 1981 operating characteristics. Again, we first assume that
all of the operating characteristics were maintained at their 1981 levels, and
then assume that each of the relevant characteristics was maintained at its 1981
level.
The results of this simulation are presented in Table 5 for the railroads
considered in this analysis and show a high degree of variability. In particular,
the large railroads (Conrail, the ATSF, and the ICG) appear to have experienced
substantial cost savings from changes in operating characteristics, while the
small railroads generally experienced losses. As was true in the case of the
merged firms, changes in W&S capital had little effect upon costs as did changes
in the percentage of coal traffic (with the exception of the SOO). In contrast,
the large firms appeared to be able to exploit economies from reduced route miles
or increased ALH, while the small firms were not. In this connection, the
economies that the ICG obtained from adjustment in route miles were striking, as
were the economies that the ATSF obtained from ALH.
While the evidence concerning the cost savings that the nonmerged firms
obtained from changed operating characteristics is mixed, it is similar to that
of the firms that experienced major mergers post Staggers. This suggests that
mergers did not have a differential impact upon the operating characteristics
employed by the railroads during the onset of regulatory freedom. Indeed, the
observed changes can probably be attributed to deregulation rather than to
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Table 5
Cost Savings Due to Operating Characteristics
By Railroad, 1981-1986
Cost Savings in 1986 if Railroad Had
Maintained 1981 Operating Characteristics
All
Operat.
Charact.
WS
Capital
ALH
Coal
Route
Miles
(Billions of 1974 $)
CRC
-.056
-3.9
.001
0.6
.004
1.7
.011
1.2
- .011
-3.0
.150
10.6
- .009
-5.1
-.046
19.1
.016
1.8
.148
39.7
.004 -.004
-2.7 6.2
.274
19.4
.004
-2.3
-.004
1.7
.135
21.5
- .062
-16.2
.009
0.64
.001
0.6
.043
17.8
.158
6.4
.010
2.6
0.0 -.001
0.0 -0.7
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Firm
Savings
Percent
GTW
Savings
Percent
SOO
Savings
Percent
ATSF
Savings
Percent
ICG
Savings
Percent
MKT
Savings
Percent
.428
30.3
- .016
-9.1
- .089
-36.9
.311
34.3
.187
50.1
- .006
-4.1
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mergers.
C. Labor Utilization For Merging and Non-Merging Firms
Additional support for the conclusion that observed cost savings are more
likely the result of non-merger related changes in operational characteristics
post-deregulation is provided by an analysis of changes in labor utilization
during the post-Staggers period. That labor savings played a major role in cost
reductions achieved by merging firms is indicated in Table 6, where we summarize
ICC data on actual labor costs of merged firms with the projected labor costs of
their constituent firms. Employment, measured through number of employees or
hours worked, has fallen dramatically for merged firms over this time period.
From 1979-1982 to 1986, employment fell 28 percent, 41 percent, 31 percent and
17 percent for the CSX, BNSYS, UPSYS and NSC roads, respectively. Over this same
time period (roughly 1980 to 1986), output increased for two roads (BNSYS and
UPSYS), and remained relatively constant for CSX and NSC. Using average
compensation rates for each of the four firms in 1986 (measured in $1974), we
compute that reduced employment accounts for savings ranging from $420 million
for the Union Pacific System to $110 million for the Norfolk Southern, figures
that are comparable to the cost adjustments associated with changes in operating
characteristics and unobserved managerial and network effects.
The remaining issue involves whether the mergers were necessary for these
firms to consolidate labor so dramatically. Table 7 explores employment trends
of the other railroads used in this analysis. With the exception of two small
roads (the Soo and the GTW), these railroads experienced reductions in their work
force and labor costs comparable to those achieved by the firms that undetook no
major merger activity. For these firms, reductions in employment from 1981 to
1986 ranged from 27 percent to 55 percent, without any of these firms having
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Table 6
COST SAVINGS REALIZED FROM EMPLOYMENT SHIFTS FOR LARGE RAIL MERGERS
(Savings in Thousands of 1974 $)
FIRM/SYSTEM (Year)
Average Number Total Hours Average Firm- Implied 1986
of Employees Paid (000) Wide Wage Rate Labor Costs
CSX Corporation:
Member Firms (1981)
CSX (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
69,508
47,803
-21,705
-31.2%
161,532
116,388
-45,144
-27.9%
$6.89
Burlington Northern System:
Member Firms (1979)
BN System (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
35,110
144,695
85,490
-59,205
-40.9%
$7.10
* ** ** * *** ** * ** * ** * * * * *
Union Pacific System:
Member Firms (1981)
UP System (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
49,713
33,271
-16,442
-33.1%
124,675
86,105
-38,570
-30.9%
$7.01
Norfolk-Southern Corporation:
Member Firms (1981)
NSC Corp. (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
41,704
34,857
-6,847
-16.4%
93,563
77,906
-15,657
-16.7%
$7.06
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission Wage Form A-200, 1979, 1981, 1986
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1,112,956
801,913
- 310,835
-27.9%
1,027,335
606,979
-420,356
-40.9%
873,972
603,596
-399,166
-30.9%
660,555
550,016
-110,538
-16.7%
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Table 7
COST SAVINGS REALIZED FROM EMPLOYMENT SHIFTS
FOR MAJOR U.S. RAILROADS NOT INVOLVED IN MERGERS
(Savings in Thousands of 1974 $)
FIRM/SYSTEM (Year)
Average Number Total Hours Average Firm- Implied 1986
of Employees Paid (000) Wide Wage Rate Labor Costs
Chicago Northwest Railroad:
CNW (1981)
CNW (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
14,345
9,450
-4,895
-34.1%
37,319
25,494
-11,825
-31.7%
$6.95
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe:
ATSF (1981)
ATSF (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
33,605
23,965
-9,640
-28.7%
83,130
57,113
-26,017
-31.3%
$7.12
******************* ***
Southern Pacific System:
SPSYS (1981) 38,561 93,090
SPSYS (1986) 29,425 70,860 $6.79
Total Change -9,136 -22,230
Percent Change -23.7% -23.9%
*Consolidated Rail Corporation:********* ** *** **
Consolidated Rail Corporation:
CRC (1981)
CRC (1986)
Total Change
Percent Change
70,264
33,768
-36,496
-51.9%
165,585
80,229
-85,356
-51.5%
$7.05
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission Wage Form A-200, 1981 and 1986.
259,501
177,273
- 82,226
-31.7%
591,924
406,671
-185,263
-31.3%'
632,433
481,408
-185,263
-23.9%
1,166,848
481,408
-601,489
-51.5%
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suffered major losses in output. These figures are comparable to those obtained
for the firms experiencing major mergers.
Since employment reductions were not limited to merged entities, it appears
that labor cost savings were possible to a large extent without merger, and
therefore that such savings should not be attributed to efficiency gains brought
about by consolidations. Indeed, Vellturo (1989) has argued that deregulation may
have played a more important role in reducing labor costs than did direct labor
savings associated with mergers.
D. Captial Utilization Issues: Tobin's q Estimates
Finally, if mergers have presented railroads with a unique opportunity to
consolidate their capital, estimates of their Tobin's-q values based on the
short-run cost function (i.e. the marginal Tobin's q) should reveal two trends.
First, merged systems should show significantly greater movement towards q values
of one than those of constituent firms prior to merger, and second, the movements
of marginal q toward unity should not be as rapid for firms not involved in
consolidations.
To construct these estimates of marginal Tobin's q, we have used our
estimated translog cost function to compute the shadow value of capital
( = - aCv/aK), and have also taken the ratio of this shadow value to the ex ante
rental price of capital. Results of these calculations for 1974, 1979 and 1986
are given in Table 8.
As is seen in Table 8, there appears to be little evidence to support the
claim that mergers were a necessary route to improve Tobin's q values through
capital consolidation and investment. Although shadow values tend to rise in
absolute value over time indicating that Class I railroads have made some
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progress toward capital consolidation, most railroads exhibit this trend,
implying that firms not involved in mergers were equally able to consolidate.
The four merged entities fall into two categories. From 1974 to 1979, prior
to merger, the constituent firms in the eastern mergers (CHES and FAMILY for CSX2
and the NW and SOU for the NSC) all had q-ratios increasing to levels not far
from unity (CHES was above unity in 1979); since these improvements came prior
to merger, merger was not a prerequisite. However, such roads with streamlined
systems may have been attractive merger targets. In contrast, roads with
excessive capital as reflected in their low Tobin's q ratios (e.g., ATSF) were
not actively pursued for end-to-end consolidation. The western mergers, on the
other hand, have shown improvements in their shadow values and q-ratios over the
1974-86 time period. The BNSYS shadow value was about two percentage points
higher in 1986 than the BN value in 1974, and the q-ratio increased by about 45
percent. Similarly, the UPSYS shadow value in 1986 was about seven percentage
points higher than the UP value in 1974, and its q-ratio increased by about 250
percent. However, the capital rationalizations inherent in these figures occurred
between 1974 and 1979, and not after the consolidations. Indeed, the output of
both the BN and UP expanded significantly during this same period, allowing both
firms to improve their capital situation by simply not expanding their capital
structure in the face of rising demand, rather than taking steps to cut back on
their capital. Other non-merged firms with significant output expansion in the
period show similar improvements in shadow values and Tobin's q ratios (e.g., the
GTW and the MKT roads).
Table 8 also provides data on the average rate of return to capital, which
we define as (R-VC)/XF, where R represents total revenues, VC represents actual
variable costs and XF represents W&S capital. With the exception of the
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TABLE 8 32
CAPITAL DISEQUILIBRIUM BY RAILROAD
SELECTED YEARS
SHADOW OPPTNTY MARG Q ROR
Year PRICE COST CAPITAL
BN 74 0.0266 0.1323 0.2013 0.0706
BN 79 0.1067 0.1383 0.7712 0.0595
BNSYS 84 0.0437 0.1640 0.2666 0.1315
BNSYS 86 0.0405 0.1366 0.2966 0.1086
FAMILY 74 0.0828 0.1341 0.6179 0.0930
FAMILY 79 0.1201 0.1398 0.8587 0.0126
CHES 74 0.1265 0.1311 0.9653 0.1031
CHES 79 0.1788 0.1400 1.2767 0.0046
CXS2 84 0.1260 0.1655 0.7613 0.0188
CSX2 86 0.0815 0.1366 0.5962 -0.1215
NW 74 0.0348 0.1256 0.2773 0.1257
NW 79 0.0792 0.1302 0.6079 0.0436
SOU 74 0.0935 0.1323 0.7064 0.1423
SOU 79 0.1022 0.1302 0.7850 0.0338
NS 84 0.0556 0.1640 0.3388 -0.0322
NS 86 0.1230 0.1366 0.9002 -0.0198
MP 75 0.0271 0.1419 0.1910 0.1541
MP 79 0.0621 0.1383 0.4492 0.1150
UP 75 0.0473 0.1257 0.3764 0.0683
UP 78 0.0589 0.1302 0.4522 0.1616
UPSYS 84 0.0208 0.1640 0.1268 0.0160
UPSYS 86 0.0629 0.1366 0.4606 0.0868
CRC 79 0.0585 0.1293 0.4526 0.0355
CRC 84 0.0512 0.1574 0.3252 0.0661
CRC 86 0.0512 0.1201 0.4264 0.0647
GTW 75 0.1705 0.1358 1.2554 0.0105
GTW 79 0.2766 0.1517 1.8233 -0.1091
GTW 84 0.3282 0.1546 2.1228 -0.0772
GTW 86 0.4443 0.1361 3.2643 -0.0815
SOO 74 0.0699 0.1362 0.5133 0.1229
SOO 79 0.0738 0.1415 0.5215 0.0635
SOO 84 0.0639 0.1640 0.3895 0.0397
SO 86 0.1318 0.1442 0.9140 0.i000
ATSF 79 0.0124 0.1302 0.0955 0.0312
ATSF 84 0.0475 0.1640 0.2895 0.0081
ATSF 86 0.0845 0.1366 0.6183 -0.0036
DRG 74 0.2061 0.1362 1.5141 0.0788
DRG 79 0.3532 0.1415 2.4955 0.0471
DRG 84 0.4326 0.1693 2.5545 0.0098
ICG 74 0.0759 0.1323 0.5738 0.0575
ICG 79 0.0897 0.1415 0.6342 -0.0176
ICG 84 0.1077 0.1724 0.6249 -0.0357
ICG 86 0.0520 0.1504 0.3455 -0.0879
MKT 74 0.0708 0.1647 0.4298 0.0064
MKT 79 0.1598 0.1573 1.0160 -0.0483
MKT 84 0.1322 0.1846 0.7162 -0.0444
MKT 86 0.2481 0.1752 1.4162 -0.0797
33
Burlington Northern System, which was able to extract sizable economic rents from
the coal traffic emanating from the Powder River Basin, there is no evidence
that merged systems earned a higher rate of return than their unmerged
counterparts. Indeed, the rate of return to capital was generally lower for the
merged entity than its constituents. Moreover, there does not appear to be any
systematic difference between the rates of return of the merged firms and the
other railroads that were not involved in merger. This is consistent with the
analysis of the Tobin q ratio's which indicated that the capital disequilibrium
of the constituent firms was not improved by merger; nor was it appreciably less
for the merged firms than for the nonmerged firms.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have attempted to assess the cost savings that can be
attributed to the end-to-end mergers that occurred in the late 1970's and early
1980's and compare them with the savings generated by changes in operating
characteristics and labor and capital utilization. Using a simulation approach
based on a translog variable cost function of the major US railroads for the
period 1974-1986, we find that the pure merger effect (a combination of scale
effects and unobserved changes in managerial organizations and network
utilization) accounted for cost savings ranging from a high of 33 percent for the
Burlington Northern to an actual cost increase of 4 percent for the CSX, with the
savings of the Norfolk Southern and the Union Pacific being roughly comparable
(respectively 15 percent and 14 percent).
It is interesting to note that the cost adjustments due to operating
characteristics were of a comparable magnitude and often of a different
direction. For example, the combined changes in operating characteristics caused
III
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the CSX to enjoy cost savings of 31 percent, while actually imposing cost
penalties on the Norfolk Southern of 26 percent. In addition, the Burlington
Northern gained an additional 36 percent in savings due to aggregate changes in
operating characteristics, while those of the Union Pacific were quite modest (2
percent). The source of these cost differentials arose primarily from changes in
route miles and ALH. Railroads that were able to increase their ALH and reduce
their route miles enjoyed substantial efficiency gains.
It is also important to note that the changes in operating characteristics
experienced by the merged firms are comparable to the other railroads considered
in this analysis, indicating that deregulation, rather than mergers, enabled
railroads to change their operating characteristics. Support for this hypothesis
is provided by the substantial rationalization of rail labor, which occurred in
both merged and unmerged firms. Reductions in the work force led to substantial
savings in labor costs that were comparable in magnitude to those occasioned by
changes in operating characteristics and the "pure" merger effects. Finally,
there appears to be little difference in movements of Tobin's q ratios for merged
vs. non-merged firms since 1979.
Since deregulation provided a climate that enabled the railroads to
rationalize their labor force and their operating characteristics, mergers were
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for these economies. Indeed, the
CSX actually appears to have experienced a small merger penalty, while the direct
gains from merger afforded to the Norfolk Southern and the UPS appeared to have
been relatively modest.
We conclude, therefore, that mergers were certainly not a prerequisite for
railroads to achieve substantial cost and productivity improvements in our
1974-1986 sample period. Deregulation also had an enormous impact; indeed, its
impact may have been much larger.
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Endnotes
1. At that time the following railroads were insolvent: Penn-Central, Lehigh
Valley, Erie-Lackawanna, New Jersey Central, Reading, Boston and Maine, and the
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific
2. For example, in 1975, three railroads had A+ or AA bond ratings from
Moody's. By 1986, eleven firms had achieved these rating.
3. The studies on rate adjustments generally conclude that the rate-setting
freedom afforded by deregulation has enhanced the railroads' ability to achieve
revenue adequacy in two principle ways: i) through the exploitation of market
dominance in a number of areas and for a number of products; and ii) by
permitting the railroads to develop innovative pricing/contract mechanisms such
as long-term contracts and multi-firm/intermodal joint marketing agreements that
have significantly enhanced their competitiveness. Studies on capital adjustments
conclude that in spite of the apparent freedom afforded by the Staggers Act,
railroads have still failed to rationalize their capital stock sufficiently to
earn a competitive return on their capital. Rail rate adjustments are analyzed
in Friedlaender (1991), Rose (1988) and Moore (1983). Capital adjustemnts are
anlayzed in Friedlaender et.al, (1991a, 1991b).
4. In 1978 the ICC raised the minimum freight revenue required for Class I
status from $1 million to $5 million; in 1983 it further raised the minimum to
$10 million.
5. For example, the following major mergers all involved consolidation of
railroads with substantial parallel trackage: the Penn-Central (from the New York
Central and the Pennsylvania railroads); the initial Burlington Northern (from
the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Burlington railroads); the
Chessie System (from the C&O, B&O, and Western Maryland railroads); and the
Family Lines (from the Seaboard, Louisville and Nashville, and Clinchfield and
Ohio railroads).
6. For example the initial Burlington Northern merger required eleven years
and three submissions before final approval, while the Penn Central application
spanned seven years. See Saunders (1978) for details.
7. One notable exception involved the proposed merger of the Southern Pacific
and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe railroads, in which each had extensive
parallel trackage. The original proposal came before the ICC in 1984 and was
finally rejected in 1987 on the basis of the potential monopoly power of the
consolidated railroad.
8. We do not analyze Conrail, which was formed from the bankrupt Eastern
railroads, because it was a governmental entity until 1986. In addition, there
were a few mergers of small lines (the Guilford System, the Grand Trunk Western,
and the Soo) that we do not consider.
9. It should be noted that this measure of W&S capital includes maintenance
expenditures.
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10. This expansion primarily occurred in the mid 1980's as the Norfolk
Southern purchased numerous feeder lines to position itself to acquire Conrail
when that system was released from federal control. The Norfolk Southern bid was
ultimately rejected by Congress, which sold Conrail to the public as an
independent entity in 1987.
11. In this study, fixed capital refers to way and structures capital that
includes track, grading, bridges, buildings, etc. Equipment capital or rolling
stock is treated as a variable input in the short run since an active rental
market exists for such equipment.
12. Since the formation of Amtrak in the early 1970's railroads have only
carried freight. Because ton-mile data are only available for total traffic, we
use this as a measure of output, but include the composition of traffic as
technological variables.
13. Another important measurement issue involves service quality. Measures
of service quality are typically market specific; for example, Levin and Weinberg
(1979) employ market shares in point-to-point markets, while Harris and Winston
(1983) use the mean and variance of transit time for specific point-to-point
shipments. Since this study relies upon data at the firm level rather than
point-to-point shipment data, an analysis of service quality is not possible.
Thus, we will not be able to account for service quality improvements.
14. See, for example, Harris (1977), Keeler (1974), Friedlaender and Spady
(1981), Caves et al (1981, 1985).
15. The analysis proceeds analogously for the multi-product case. See Bailey
and Friedlaender (1982) for a discussion of multi-product measures of returns to
scale.
16. Caves et al. (1985) and Friedlaender et al. (1991) have utilized measures
of returns to scale that incorporate network effects.
17. See Caves, Christensen, and Swanson (1981), Brown, Caves and Christensen
(1979), Friedlaender and Spady (1981), and Caves et al. (1985) for related work
on rail costs.
18. The other railroads included in the sample that were not affected by
merger were: the Chicago Northwest Transit; the Kansas City Southern; the
Missouri Kansas Texas; and the Southern Pacific. The results for these railroads
were not reported because they failed to satisfy a sufficient number of
regularity conditions to give an adequate picture of- their behavior over the
sample period.
19. Costs and related variables were all measured in 1974 dollars to
abstract from the effects of inflation
20. See Mundlak (1978), Vellturo (1989) and Berndt et al. (1991) for a full
discussion of this point. Most analyses of fixed effects assume that they affect
total costs alone (e.g., Mundlak (1978) and Caves et al. (1985). Because we
assume that these effects may be related to factor utilization and that firms are
able to minimize costs with respect to variable factors, we introduce them into
the linear terms of the factor price expressions within the cost function. We do
not, however, introduce them into the capital stock terms because we assume that
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in the short run firms are not able to minimize costs with respect to W&S
capital. To ensure consistency we impose the appropriate cross-equation
restrictions on the coefficients of the indicator variables in the cost equation
and the input share equations.
21. The instruments used were related to firm-specific demand variables and
included mine-mouth coal prices, coal production, oil prices, farm income, and
the value of manufacturing shipments. To test the hypothesis of endogeneity, the
system of equations was estimated in two ways: first by a 3SLS procedure that
assumed that output and its related variables were endogenous; and second, by a
maximum likelihood (ML) procedure that assumed that all of the regressors were
uncorrelated with the error terms. Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity ML
estimation is efficient, while 3SLS is consistent. If the alternative hypothesis
of endogeneity is true, only 3SLS is consistent. The X2 statistic corresponding
to the null hypothesis that B3SLS = BML was 1252.99, which is much larger than
the critical value with 38 degrees of freedom at any reasonable level of
significance. This indicates that output and its related variables should be
treated as endogenous. Hence the cost function and its associated input share
equations were estimated by 3SLS, with demand-related instruments used for output
and its related variables.
22. The estimates of the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity,
based on the White (1980) procedures.
23. This is to be expected, since an increase in W&S capital should permit
a firm to economize on its variable factors. Indeed, a positive elasticity would
imply a negative marginal product of capital and thus violate a regularity
condition.
24. Long run total costs are obtained by solving Eq (5) for the equilibrating
amount of W&S capital that equates the firm's opportunity cost with its shadow
value of capital, and then substituting this optimal amount of capital into the
estimated cost function. The estimates of long run returns to expansion are
simply obtained by utilizing Eq (4) with the optimal amount of capital.
25. This approach is applied to each of the four mergers of interest with the
exception of the Norfolk Southern (NSC). Shortly after merger the NSC acquired
significant trackage in an effort to better position itself for its offer to
purchase Conrail (an offer ultimately rejected by Congress). Had the Norfolk and
Western and the Southern Systems not merged, these acquisitions would have made
little sense, since neither system could separately position itself adequately.
We therefore assume that these additional acquisitions were a product of the
merger and would not have been pursued by the constituent firms. As such, output
and technical factors were fixed for the constituent firms at their pre merger
levels.
III
REFERENCES
Bailey, Elizabeth E. and Ann F. Friedlaender [1982], "Market Structure and
Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Literature, 20:3, September,
1024-1048.
Berndt, Ernst, Ann F. Friedlaender, Judy Shaw-Er WangChaing and Christopher A.
Vellturo (1991), "Mergers, Deregulation, and Cost Savings in the U.S.
Rail Industry," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
No. 3749, June, 1991. Forthcoming, Journal of Productivity Analysis.
Caves, Douglas W., Laurits R. Christensen, and Joseph A. Swanson [1981],
"Productivity Growth, Scale Economies, and Capacity Utilization in U.S.
Railroads, 1955-1974," American Economic Review, 71:5, December, 994-
1002.
----- ,Laurits R. Christensen, and Joseph A. Swanson [1980] "Productivity in U.S.
Railroads, 1951-1974," Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, pp. 166-181.
----- , Michael W. Tretheway, and Robert J. Windle [1985], "Network Effects and
the Measurement of Returns to Scale and Density for U.S. Railroads," in
Andrew F. Daughety, ed., Analytical Studies in Transport Economics,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 97-120.
Friedlaender, Ann F. [1991], "Fair Rates and Rates of Return in a Deregulated
Rail Industry," MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 576, March.
-----, Ernst R. Berndt, Judy Shaw-Er Wang Chiang, and Christopher A. Vellturo
[1991], "Rail Costs and Capital Adjustments in a Quasi-Regulated
Environment," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.3841,
September.
-----, and Richard H. Spady [1981], Freight Transport Regulation: Equity.,
Efficiency, and Competition in the Rail and Trucking Industry,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Harris, Robert G. [1977], "Economies of Traffic Density in the Rail Freight
Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:2, Autumn, 556-564.
-----, and Clifford Winston [1982], "Potential Benefits of Rail Mergers: An
Econometric Analysis of Network Effects on Service Quality," Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol 64, No.1 (February), 32-39.
Keeler, Theodore E. [1983], Railroads. Freight and Public Policy, Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution.
----- , [1974], "Railroad Costs, Returns to Scale and Excess Capacity," Review of
Economics and Statistics, 56:2, May, 201-208.
Levin, Richard C. and D. Weinberg [1979], "Alternatives for Restructuring the
Railroads: End-to-End or Parallel Mergers?", Economic Inauiry, 27:3,
371-388.
Meyer, John R. and William B. Tye [1985], "The Regulatory Transition," American
Economic Review, 75:2, May, 46-51.
Moore, Thomas G. [1983], "Rail and Truck Reform: The Record So Far," Regulation,
November/December, 33-41.
Mundlak, Yair [1978], "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data,"
Econometrica, 46:1, January, 69-85.
Rose, Nancy L. [1988], "An Economic Assessment of Surface Freight Transportation
Deregulation," in Economic Deregulation: Promise and Performance,
Proceedings of the 1987 Donald S. MacNaughton Symposium, Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 149-173.
Saunders, Richard [1978], The Railroad Mergers and the Coming of Conrail,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Vellturo, Christopher A. [19893, "The Deregulation of the U.S. Rail Industry:
Efficiency and Equity in Attaining Rail Viability," Cambridge, MA: MIT
Department of Economics, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, September.
White, Halbert J. [1980], "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, 48:4,
May, 817-838.
